

Routes to tour in Germany


The Harz and Heath Route



German roads will get you there — to areas at times so attractive that one route leads to the next, from the Harz mountains to the Lüneburg Heath, say. Maybe you should take a look at both. The Harz, northernmost part of the Mittelgebirge range, is holiday country all the year round. In summer for hikers, in winter for skiers in their tens of thousands. Tour from the hill resorts of Osterode, Clausthal-Zellerfeld or Bad Harzburg or from the 1,000-

year-old town of Goslar. The Heath extends from Celle, with its town centre of half-timbered houses unscathed by the war and the oldest theatre in Germany, to Lüneburg, also 1,000 years old. It boasts wide expanses of flat countryside, purple heather and herds of local curly-horned sheep.

Visit Germany and let the Harz and Heath Route be your guide.



- 1 Brunswick
- 2 An old Lüneburg Heath farmhouse
- 3 The Harz
- 4 Göttingen

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Andropov's unfulfilled German mission

DIE WELT

The late Mr Andropov did not have enough time between taking over from Mr Brezhnev in November 1982 and vanishing from public life last summer to draw up a clearly outlined policy on Germany.

But there are clear signs that the former KGB chief was keen, in spite of fundamental misgivings, on cooperative relations with Bonn.

He seems to have hacked bids by the East German leader, Herr Honecker, in the same direction.

When Mr Andropov came to power, Helmut Schmidt had been out of office in Bonn for a mere six weeks, but shortly before Mr Brezhnev died he responded to the change-over in Bonn.

In a greetings telegram to Chancellor Schmidt he called for further development of relations between the two countries in the advantage of both peoples.

The new Soviet leader followed this approach. On 15 November 1982, when world leaders were in Moscow for Mr Brezhnev's funeral, he conferred for an hour with President Carstens and Foreign Minister Genscher.

This detailed discussion was clearly intended to be of demonstrative importance, as was shown when Mr Andropov expressly welcomed the new Chancellor's government policy statement as a sign of continuity.

It seems to have been an important indication for the Soviet leader that a change of government in Bonn did not mean any change in the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Andropov, Carstens and Genscher agreed that "mutual advantageous cooperation between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany on the basis of treaties and agreements concluded" was to be further developed.

The new Soviet leader's level-headed line of argument impressed President Carstens. It was distinctly different from the at times mercurial manner of Mr Brezhnev.

There was also no point, it is now clear, in the well-meaning deployment of Italian, British, French and US troops as a peacekeeping force.

The Western units have proved too weak and the US policy of crisis management too short-sighted.

Israel, invariably viewed by Washington as a guarantor of American Lebanon policy, has long felt overtaxed. Prime Minister Shamir will not be joining in President Gemayel's fight for political survival.

He is a trump card that is no longer good for a trick. Besides, the US concept

The President was particularly struck by the breadth of Mr Andropov's knowledge.

So the change of power in Moscow seemed unlikely, at least after the first direct encounter, to take a turn for the worse from Bonn's point of view.

Against the background of Soviet economic requirements seen in a more disinterested light by Mr Andropov, new prospects of cooperation seemed to be in the offing.

Realistically, the Soviet concept taken over straight from Mr Brezhnev by Mr Andropov was bound to include the aim of gradually driving a wedge between the Federal Republic and its main ally, the United States.

This feature of Soviet foreign policy that has never been abandoned since the Federal Republic came into being in September 1949 became particularly strikingly apparent in the later course of the missile modernisation debate.

Mr Andropov's propagandists did not stop short at resorting to the long-established practice of first wielding the stick, then offering the carrot.

Even so, the second and last meeting he held with leading Bonn politicians took its course with a striking lack of emotion, although it cannot be said to have been unproblematic.

It was in July 1983 when Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Kohl visited

Moscow, at a time of rising East-West tension. "He is a shrewd and well-informed interlocutor," the Chancellor said. "His state of health need lead no-one to reach mistaken conclusions." Their meeting was very nearly called off because the Soviet leader was seriously ill. The talks, Herr Kohl said, were "positive, informative and constructive from the viewpoint of the long-term development of relations." Mr Andropov's style of negotiating, Herr Genscher said, was "open and direct." He used hard arguments but did not resort to verbal confrontation. The two sides again affirmed that "in spite of clashes of ideological convictions and social policy views" long-term cooperation and the development of good-neighbourly relations were envisaged.



Meeting place: Moscow. The East Berlin party chief, Erich Honecker (left) and Bonn Chancellor Helmut Kohl together in Moscow, where they paid their last respects to the late Soviet President, Yuri Andropov. (Photo: dpa)

They failed, of course, to reach agreement on missile deployment by the West and the threat of a breakdown of arms control talks with the Americans by Moscow. But on other points, such as

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Lebanon: chaos and despair in the rubble

Nothing seems to work any more in Lebanon. Whatever has been tried out to contain chaos and war or nip them in the bud has invariably ended in more dead, more rubble and more despair.

The parties in the civil war have proved unable to resolve the conflict. Israel's attempt to pacify the country by means of a lightning campaign and protect its own northern border on a long-term basis has failed.

There was also no point, it is now clear, in the well-meaning deployment of Italian, British, French and US troops as a peacekeeping force.

The Western units have proved too weak and the US policy of crisis management too short-sighted.

Israel, invariably viewed by Washington as a guarantor of American Lebanon policy, has long felt overtaxed. Prime Minister Shamir will not be joining in President Gemayel's fight for political survival.

He is a trump card that is no longer good for a trick. Besides, the US concept

of being on the spot at a crucial point in the East-West conflict has been a mistake.

In Lebanon it is not the Soviet Union that needs disciplining. Moscow is cautiously maintaining a low profile. Discipline needs to be imposed on Syria, and with it the Shiites, Druze and Palestinian militias.

In a war on many fronts in a country that is torn apart the US marines may succeed in protecting themselves and in occasionally showing the flag by dealing out retaliatory blows, but the conflict can no longer be kept under control.

The Christian President, Amin Gemayel, has miscalculated. His hopes of relying on Western great-power support to hold his own against Syrian intervention have been dashed.

In vain does he now offer Opposition groups what he promised them months ago at the so-called reconciliation conference in Geneva.

He is offering them a share in power, realignment of the constitutional order and renunciation of the jealously guarded Christian claim to supremacy.

Washington has tried on several occasions, without much success, to persuade Gemayel to be more conciliatory on these points.

Yet heedless of the fact that he was abjectly dependent on the United States the youthful head of state remained obdurate for months, which now seems incomprehensible.

Now his writ extends little further than the President's bunker his proposals are no longer worth much.

The Shiites and Druzes are taking by force of arms what was denied them at the conference table. The Syrians are demonstrating their unbroken power and nuisance potential.

The Soviet Union is calmly looking on while the United States, powerful yet so powerless, is plunged ever deeper into the morass of a war that seems never to end.

Powerlessness must be a bitter new experience for President Reagan.

Bernd Stadelmann

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 8 February 1984)

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WORLD AFFAIRS

War and peace: ball back in the experts' court

Stöcker Stadt-Anzeiger

After an autumn that wasn't as hot as had been feared, and several weeks of ice age in East-West ties that have not seemed too chilly either, the debate on war and peace has evidently reverted to the experts.

They will be relieved. It saves them inconvenient questions, but also takes them further and further away from a target they must constantly bear in mind: that of ensuring public backing for their policies.

This reversion will have been the reason why an event went virtually unnoticed by the wider public that amounted to little short of a revolution in American security policy.

It was the kite flown by Mr Rowny, the chief US delegate to the Start talks in Geneva. He speculated publicly whether the Start and INF medium-range missile talks in Geneva might not be reactivated by a merger.

In the past Washington has felt the very idea to be heretical, let alone putting it into practice. Good and less good reasons were advanced in support of this US viewpoint.

One good reason was that two issues that individually are complex enough will not grow easier by being discussed together rather than separately.

Besides, dealing with the more difficult of the two problems, and many experts felt Start was the more difficult, would tend to delay a solution to the even more pressing issue of the arms build-up by both sides in Europe.

Washington was no less emphatic in endorsing reasons that carried less conviction, such as the argument that a merger could be viewed by Moscow as a concession.

First, the Soviet delegates could return to the conference table without losing face (albeit a fresh conference table).

Second, merging the two sets of talks could eliminate in a more or less elegant fashion the trickiest issue faced by both sides, that of how to take British and French nuclear forces into account.

When dealt with at the same conference table as the gigantic nuclear arsenals of the superpowers, the Anglo-French nuclear deterrent hardly seems to matter.

Hitherto the United States has been keen to avoid as much as the appearance of any such concession.

The American argument is that unlike the United States, which carried on negotiating in spite of continued deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles, the Soviet delegations had walked out of the talks the moment the first medium-range US missiles were deployed in Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany.

So there was no need to pay any price whatever for the return of the Soviet delegations to Geneva.

This argument has a plausible ring, but it is none too reassuring given the explosive nature of the topic, and least reassuring of all for Germans and Europeans in East and West.

They would be hardest-hit by any consequences of a final breakdown of these talks in particular.

Whatever importance one attaches to the denials issued in the wake of Mr Rowny's first tentative suggestion at the end of January, one point seems reasonable clear.

It is that the Soviet Union could now, if it wanted, suggest the merging of the two sets of talks without needing to fear that Washington would reject the idea out of hand.

That at least is left of the kite flown by the US chief delegate after the various denials that followed it.

It is trend in keeping with the recent change President Reagan has shown signs of, given that he must be worried he might not secure re-election if he were to continue to behave as an implacable enemy of the Soviet Union.

But how will Moscow respond in reality? Regardless how the Russians rate Mr Rowny's kite, it is extremely doubtful whether they will want to help the President to improve his prospects of re-election.

They have lately taken to criticising Mr Reagan without the slightest trace of their previous diplomatic restraint.

There are few signs that Moscow would prefer to see a difficult but known incumbent re-elected as the lesser of two evils, the other being the risk of having to adjust to a possibly less aggressive but unknown successor to Mr Reagan in the Oval Office.

Besides, the Soviet leaders are likely to be fairly inflexible in the near future after the death of Mr Andropov.

If they were nonetheless to take up the heavily hedged American offer, there would still be a long and arduous round of negotiations to complete before a compromise might appear feasible on the most critical issue for Europe, that of medium-range missiles.

Pointless

The same goes for Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's proposal for the five nuclear powers to negotiate at a new body and for the Mexican proposal at the UN disarmament conference in Geneva, which has got virtually nowhere in years of talks.

Missile deployment goes ahead unabated. By the beginning of next year at the latest, especially in respect of Pershing 2s, which are only to be stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany, a stage will have been reached at which further talks are bound to seem more or less pointless in Soviet eyes.

The only circumstance in which they would not be pointless would be if Washington were to declare itself ready to dismantle weapon systems already deployed.

That seems hardly likely inasmuch as the Russians seem unlikely to make correspondingly attractive counter-proposals.

So in a year's time at the latest people in the Federal Republic will have to live with the idea that in addition to SS-20s stationed in the Soviet Union modern short-range missiles with a delivery time of three minutes are aimed at targets in

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Getting together: Hans-Jochen Vogel, SPD Bundestag leader (left) is greeted in Washington by US Secretary of State George Shultz.

Vogel urges Nato initiative to get arms talks going again

Hans-Jochen Vogel, SPD leader in the Bonn Bundestag, has called on Nato to make the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact a "specific and comprehensive offer" to get the stalled arms control and disarmament talks back on the move.

In a speech to the Overseas Writers' Club in Washington he said the removal of US medium-range missiles lately deployed in Europe came high on the list of SPD priorities.

The superpowers could make headway on disarmament if both sides were to meet each other half-way and to agree to a temporary ban on fresh deployment later this year with progress in mind.

Herr Vogel was in Washington to outline the Social Democrats' attitude towards Nato and future military strategy of the North Atlantic pact.

He first conferred with Vice-President Bush and State Department officials and other security experts. At the end of a three-day visit he held talks with Secretary of State Shultz.

The main aim of his political talks was to dispel doubts on the part of the US administration as to the Bonn Opposition SPD's loyalty to Nato.

In his speech to the Overseas Writers' Club he mentioned uncertainties and misunderstandings that had arisen in American as to the German Opposition's views following the anti-deployment resolution by the Social Democratic party conference.

He thus saw his task as partly that of rectifying these distorted views. The SPD, he said, was firmly in favour of the Atlantic alliance, but it also felt that disputes within the alliance should be had out in public.

The Nato offer of a resumption of promising disarmament talks to the Soviet Union, as envisaged by the SPD, would need to incorporate the following features:

- A merger of the talks on intercontinental and medium-range missiles with a view to reducing nuclear armament;
- reduction and abolition of chemical weapons, gradually and by region if need be;
- the signing of a treaty reducing troops strengths and armament in Europe on the basis of ceilings already agreed;
- agreement on confidence-building measures designed to include the option of nuclear-free corridors.

The SPD also felt it was essential to embark on a new and constructive dialogue on future Nato strategy aiming at strategy paying greater heed than hitherto to the political objective of preventing war and the defensive character of armed forces.

Herr Vogel stressed that Social Democrats stood by the existing Nato strategy and would do so until a new strategy was agreed.

Within this framework the Western Europeans would have to bear their part in Nato more clearly in mind and to gain a greater point than in the past of speaking with one voice in dealings with the United States.

Only then could the current state of affairs be replaced by the partnership equals to which President Kennedy referred over 20 years previously.

After his first round of talks in Washington Herr Vogel was reported to have held a press conference and had encountered understanding of the SPD's view that the breakdown of East-West dialogue was unsatisfactory and could not remain a permanent state of affairs.

But there were no signs yet of "specific initiatives" to reactivate the dialogue by the United States over and above what had so far been said.

He stressed that more must be done than to express readiness to hold talks get the disarmament talks going again.

In Washington interest had been focused in the idea of combining the medium-range and Start missile talks. He had yet to be viewed as a specific proposal, not even in the form of a proposal, he said.

Martin E. Schulz

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9 February 1984)

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HOME AFFAIRS

Likelihood that system will eventually revert to three parties

Germany's political party structure was for a long time stable. Perhaps even rigid.

From the late 1950s until the beginning of the 1980s there were two major parties, the CDU/CSU and the SPD. Plus a smaller party, the FDP.

One was conservative, Christian-social and liberal, the other social democratic-liberalist. The FDP's staunch economic liberalism was initially coupled to nationalist ideas. It later increasingly shifted towards left-wing liberal domestic policies.

When the Federal Republic was formed in 1949, there were many parties. Why did they disappear? Why did no new parties emerge?

The answer is that the CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP met the needs of the electorate.

The CDU/CSU attracted the Christian-social, conservative and, to some extent, nationalist elements.

It even became the representative of economic liberalism, federalism and regionally oriented elements.

It championed the interests of ethnic Germans displaced from their home areas.

The SPD served social democratic and socialist trends. With its rejection of disarmament and Nato, its neutralism and pacifism, it also appealed to the national yearnings of a heaten nation.

Eventually, the left-wing liberal ideas were in any event part of its heritage gained weight in the party.

The FDP was the purest embodiment of economic liberalism. In the early stages this was coupled with a nationalist drive; but was more and more replaced by a liberal legal and domestic policy that started tending towards left wing liberalism in the mid-1960s.

So there was something for everybody.

Two trends emerged at the beginning of the 1980s: one was a mixture of ecological awareness anti-industrialism and the rejection of modern civilisation based on material gain.

The other was marked by fear of war, lack of interest in defence, by neutralism and a muted stress on interests passed off as "national".

These two trends would actually have called for two (or more) new parties.

In the end, they resulted in one new movement, mostly calling itself the Greens though sometimes also the Alternatives.

The reason for this is that the two bundles of interests are seen by their protagonists as belonging together.

What other explanation is there for

the fact that no party that would be both ecological and middle-class — a sort of Green CDU or FDP — has emerged?

Some of the new ideas will pass as all fads pass — especially in their present exaggerated form. This is shown by the ebbing campaign against the Nato missile deployment.

Other trends will prove more durable. But it is still questionable whether the Green-Alternative party will remain. Probably not.

The SPD opened up towards the ideas of the new party, first hesitantly and after the change of government in Bonn rather hastily. This applies particularly to the main elements of the new party: the ecological-alternative and the neutralist-pacifist.

In more and more areas where the Greens-Alternatives are politically in evidence there are signs of a lasting cooperation with the SPD.

The new party will shed its sect-like and fundamentalist branch and adjust to the SPD. The SPD, in its turn, will adjust to the Greens — though the extent will vary, depending on conditions.

There is much to indicate that the Greens-Alternatives will one day be absorbed by the SPD, as was the case with Gustav Heinemann's Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei party in the 1950s.

Plenty of reasons will be put forward on both sides. The Greens will point to the need for *realpolitik*, that fragmentation helps only the enemy and that society can only be changed by a major party.

In contrast to earlier Bonn-Moscow summits Mr Andropov and his aides did not rule out discussion of intra-German

ties with Herr Kohl and Herr Genscher. The argument had always been that the GDR was a sovereign state, so it could not be discussed. This time it was discussed, and although views differed, there was a desire for improvement.

Herr Honecker who, like the Russians, was primarily interested in flourishing ties with the Kohl government for economic motives, clearly felt able to rely on Mr Andropov for support in this respect.

The billion-Deutschmark loan to the GDR underwritten to Bonn last summer indirectly eased the pressure on Moscow.

Bernot Conrad
(Die Welt, 11 February 1984)

Industrial action slogans are out of place in this general mood of optimism that has even weathered the heated missile debate.

Union leaders in the metal and printing sectors are faced with growing disenchantment among their members who fear that they could be drawn into an industrial dispute just as the long awaited upturn is getting off the ground.

The workers realise that a strike at this stage of the economic development would mean a major setback.

It is therefore understandable that the contemplated industrial action to bring about the 35-hour work week is extremely unpopular among union members.

They know how much their jobs depend on the upturn. A political trial of strength between some unions and a Bonn government they resent would not meet with general approval.

It is therefore to be hoped that the parties to collective bargaining will find an economically feasible compromise.

But the good news from the pollsters should not deceive the government into believing that its policy of change is over the hump.

The coalition has avowed that it is interested not only in economic stability but also in spiritual leadership and political ethics.

The Bonn affairs have cast a shadow on these aspirations.

There is much left for the Chancellor to do as the voter bides his time.

Hermann Derheimer
(Allgemeine Zeitung Mainz, 4 February 1984)

are looking for a small and distinguished party.

But a return to the old three-party system need not mean that everything will be as it was.

If the SPD were to absorb more than just a Greens-Alternatives residue, it would change internally and its axis would shift to the left.

This would not necessarily mean a radically more leftist policy. After all, even in its current cooperation with the Greens-Alternatives the SPD has been shifting to the left — and not only in Hesse.

A return to the old three-party system would result in more advantages than disadvantages.

The system does have its faults. But it has resulted in stable governments, making changes of government more difficult, without preventing them.

The present fourth party does not make for more rational politics.

And there is no telling whether another party in its place would be any better.

Johann Georg Reissmüller
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
für Deutschland, 8 February 1984

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the readiness of Mr Andropov and Foreign Minister Gromyko to renegotiate on a realistic basis bilateral agreements on scientific and technological cooperation, cultural exchange and legal assistance that had previously come to grief over the status of West Berlin, a new start seemed possible.

Nothing has yet come of this project, but Mr Gromyko reaffirmed to Herr Genscher in Stockholm last month that it was still in the cards as far as Moscow was concerned.

In contrast to earlier Bonn-Moscow summits Mr Andropov and his aides did not rule out discussion of intra-German

Polls show government is still popular despite scandals

Scandals always catch the headlines. The routine doesn't.

The uproar over the Flick party donations investigation and the Werner-Kiesling scandal has pushed the solid and certainly not unsuccessful day-to-day work of the Kohl-Genscher government into the background.

But politics is more than just passing sensations and outrage over the mistakes of an individual minister and his bureaucracy.

A big majority of the public seems unaffected by the turbulence of the past few weeks.

Opinion polls by three top institutes show a stable picture for the CDU/CSU.

If an election were held now either the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition would continue in government or the CDU/CSU would gain an absolute majority.

The SPD share of the vote is stabilising around 30 per cent while the FDP is near the crucial five per cent hurdle and thus still at risk.

Despite their behaviour in Bonn and elsewhere, the Greens would seem assured of sufficient voters to remain in the Bundestag in any election.

The opinion samplings were taken on

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Germany from the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

By the same token, the Soviet Union and of Moscow will be threatened by fresh 2s with a flight time of between 10 and 14 minutes.

It would seem to be derisory to propose confidence-building measures in such a situation.

But what is one to do: ignore or forget the sad loss, that in no way reduces the constantly growing danger.

Hans Gerlach
(Kölnischer Stadt-Anzeiger, 11 February 1984)

■ GERMANY

Challenge that faces any government in Berlin

West Berlin CDU leader Eberhard Diepgen, 42, has been elected Governing Mayor by the House of Representatives. He succeeds Richard von Weizsäcker, who is expected to be nominated as the next Bonn President.

Richard von Weizsäcker has resigned as mayor of Berlin to succeed Karl Carstens as Bonn head of state. Is it the end of an era in the divided city?

Possibly not. But it has been an important stage in the city's development, if only a brief one.

For just over three years the two major parties sent leading politicians to look after affairs in West Berlin.

One was sent to stem the tide of decline, the alarming rate at which the party previously in power was losing its grip.

The other was intended to put this power vacuum to good use and bring about a change of government.

Three years ago Hans-Jochen Vogel was elected governing mayor and entrusted with looking after the legacy of a fairly sick and esre-worn coalition.

In spite of the hard work he devoted to the task he was able to do no more than alleviate the repercussions of decline and soon had to hand over to Richard von Weizsäcker, who beat him at the polls.

Weizsäcker had taken over as Opposi-

sition leader in Berlin some time earlier; Vogel stayed on for a while as leader of the new Opposition.

For a time West Berlin could pride itself on having the best men for the job as both mayor and Opposition leader. Now it has neither. Both are back in Bonn. Where does that leave Berlin?

First, the people of Berlin have seen for themselves over the past three years what politics can be like. The memory will remain, at least as a spur and a critical foil.

At the same time people in the city who are politically aware will have appreciated that while weak politicians can accelerate decline even outstanding personalities have difficulty in solving hopelessly snarled-up problems and structures.

The commitment shown first by Social Democrat Hans-Jochen Vogel, then by Christian Democrat Richard von Weizsäcker will be sure to have impressed and encouraged West Berliners.

But they will continue for the foreseeable future to face the task for which they need this very courage.

West Berlin has often been termed an outpost or a front-line city. Such slogans, like all catchphrases, are both right and wrong.

In Berlin's case the front-line epithet has long grown ambiguous and contradictory.

In the days of the Cold War West Ber-



One goes out, one comes in. Outgoing Berlin Governing Mayor Richard von Weizsäcker (left) with his successor, Eberhard Diepgen.

lin (and its protecting powers) testified to both the values of free society and the West's will to self-assertion in the international confrontation.

In principle this didn't change much in the detente era, but in the processes of normalisation made possible by both overall detente and Bonn's new Ostpolitik and policy on Germany the tension that was partly a threat and partly a challenge to the people of Berlin was also normalised.

Having been taken down a peg or two, as it were, the Berliners were said to have felt a little wide of their bearings and no longer sure just where they stood.

Whatever truth there may be in this observation, a more important point is that West Berlin went on to become a front-line city in an entirely different sense.

It had previously stood for the advantages of a free society. From the early 1970s the problematic aspects of free society grew particularly apparent in the city.

They included the recession, the limits to the welfare state, signs of degeneration of party politics, criticism of civilisation and the partly angry, partly apathetic rejection of the established system by the younger generation.

These critical shortcomings were exacerbated by obvious problems with a bungled housing policy, by imbalance in generation patterns, by the large percentage of foreign residents and by the disadvantageous location of West Berlin industry, a location problem that defies solution.

Only the city's cultural activities enjoyed a reputation extending well beyond Berlin's borders.

The arts may be subsidised to the hilt but arts policy will still be far less expensive than slum clearance. It also has a strictly limited effect on living conditions of the majority of the people.

Not even the political elite of all parties could readily have dealt with problems of such magnitude. What made it worse was that West Berlin went to the dogs with jobs for the boys and politically appointed bureaucrats, ruling out effective control.

Vogel and Weizsäcker were able to do no more than provide initial stimuli for change.

The city is now governed by a local mayor again, but there is always the risk of a return to the shortcomings of old.

Everything that has so far been said about Berlin's much-vaunted function as a turntable between East and West may have a limited significance in terms of

cultural exchange and the "consciousness industry."

In the final analysis West Berlin is a leading a sheltered existence; it is living on borrowed time. That is why it remains dependent on the protecting

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Bastian quits the parliamentary Greens

Gert Bastian has carried out his threat to resign as a Green MP in the Bonn Bundestag. It was arguably predictable move.

As a former Bundeswehr general he can hardly have imagined seriously that a single threat to resign would persuade the parliamentary party to toe a line.

He has thrown in his towel because he was sick and tired of the lack of concepts and the constant justification of hates among Greens and Alternatives.

His resignation from the parliamentary party is also logical inasmuch as he felt he was being misused for propaganda purposes by fellow-Green MPs.

They were using him as a former Bundeswehr general to give the ecological movement an anti-American and anti-Western defence slant.

His accusation that the Greens are partly infiltrated by Communist cadres, especially former Maoists, has not been disproved either.

Gert Bastian has not ruled out the possibility of a return to the fold in certain circumstances, but his resignation is likely to be the beginning of the end of the Green and Alternative movement's parliamentary existence.

A process of erosion is certainly apparent. It needs only two other Green MPs to follow in his footsteps for the Greens to forfeit their status as a separate party in the Bundestag.

As yet they are still able to seal off rifts in the parliamentary party's ranks but the chips will be down when the present MPs are expected to hand over to others waiting in the wings.

It takes little power of prophesy to forecast that a fair number of Green MPs will then discover they have no political and economic assistance is put to good use.

This is the challenge the new city government faces.

(Nordwest Zeitung, 10 February 1984)

■ PERSPECTIVE

Thrashing out alternative defence ideas

Alternative strategies were the subject of a hearing held in Bonn by a Bundestag defence committee that is extremely busy at the moment.

In addition to the hearing it is going about its normal business and starting work as a commission of enquiry into the Kießling Affair.

On the opening day of the hearing five experts made submissions. They were Karl Kaiser of the German Foreign Policy Association, Joachim Seiffert of Kiel University, Dr Lübckemeier of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Dr Lutz of Hamburg University peace research department and Desn Gramm, a high-ranking Bundeswehr chaplain.

Professor Kaiser said that given the prevailing overall conditions of East-West conflict there could be no dispensing with the deterrent.

The West could thus not abandon the flexible response strategy it had adopted to prevent war.

He favoured dispensing with the concept of alternative strategy inasmuch as genuine alternatives did not exist for the reason stated and it could only be a matter of ensuring that the flexible response strategy was put to optimum effect.

All strategies had to fulfil three requirements. They must prevent war, maintain freedom and be assured of democratic endorsement.

Professor Kaiser was critical of the absolute importance that seemed to have been given to preventing war. Preserving peace, an indispensable objective, was dangerously disregarded to the point of toying with unacceptable better red than dead ideas.

He attributed to various reasons the acceptance crisis the nuclear deterrent was undergoing. One was that many people were no longer prepared to accept that four decades of peace in Europe amid a world at war had only been possible because the risk of nuclear war had acted as a deterrent.

The main argument against a no first use undertaking in respect of nuclear weapons was that it decisively reduced the risk any aggressor ran and thereby made conventional warfare more probable.

Any such demand presupposed the establishment of a conventional balance. All the countries of Western Europe could afford was to raise the nuclear threshold.

Entirely ruling out the use of nuclear weapons in defending Western Europe in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack would entail costs so enormous as to go way beyond the realms of what was feasible.

Professor Seiffert dealt with the crisis of the socialist economic system and with the Soviet concept of parity in military strategy.

Continued from page 4

powers and the Federal Republic of Germany.

What West Berlin needs is solidarity, and above all political leaders who can promote solidarity and guarantee that political and economic assistance is put to good use.

This is the challenge the new city government faces.

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 February 1984)

He pointed out that Moscow continued to be guided by its foreign policy and military strategy concept of "permanent change of the international balance of power in favour of socialism."

By the terms of this concept so-called peaceful coexistence was a temporary peace at the end of which the communist system would gain supremacy and the entire world as its sphere of influence.

He stressed that this view of peaceful coexistence warranted the justification of war as the continuation of politics by means of military force whenever it served the interests of progressive forces.

It was thus only logical for the Warsaw Pact states to use their military potential as a political factor in their concept aimed at constant change in the international balance of power.

The Soviet view of parity in military strategy amounted to the Soviet Union itself having to have the capability to declare the status quo in the East Bloc irreversible.

Yet Moscow must also be able to wield a decisive influence on domestic conflict in the West and in the developing countries.

Results so far of the Soviet political and military strategy concept indicated that it had failed to work. The deployment of medium-range US missiles in Europe was a setback for global Soviet strategy.

"The strategic finality of the Soviet concept is beginning to be transformed into its opposite: the global balance of power is tipping the other way and forcing the Soviet superpower to take decisive action."

The danger, Professor Seiffert added, lay in the possibility of the Soviet Union continuing to build up its military power and intensifying its threats.

A more encouraging prospect would be if the Soviet Union were to decide to come to a political compromise with the West that provided it with an opportunity of dealing with its domestic problems.

The West could best promote this process by looking after its own security interests while offering to cooperate in the economic sector "and to establish a just and lasting peace order in Europe in the sense of the Harmel Report."

Lübckemeier dealt with what he felt were the main reasons for the crisis Western strategy was undergoing.

He mentioned the credibility problem of the nuclear deterrent and stressed the decline in confidence in the ability of governments as risk managers.

This problem of risk management was particularly important and had largely arisen as a result of the interruption in detente policy.

It was also a fundamental aspect of the nuclear deterrent that it was acceptable as long as it was unlikely to be used, whereas acceptance declined and vanished as soon as it had to work as a matter of survival.

He was strongly opposed to the threat of first use of nuclear weapons. He advocated a "denuclearisation" of strategy.

A measure of improvement in Nato's conventional forces would be indispensable, but funds would only be available if the North Atlantic pact were to devise a convincing military and political concept of safeguarding peace.

It would need to include cooperation and detente with the Soviet Union and would decide on the success of a denuclearisation policy.

Safeguarding the peace remained first and foremost a political task.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 7 February 1984)

A look into non-nuclear ways of maintaining peace

Former CDU general secretary Kurt Biedenkopf has for some time been concerned with the possibility of preserving peace without nuclear weapons.

What particularly interests him is the extent to which it has come to influence the general public, rather than a handful of individuals, in the so-called peace debate.

Its influence on the CDU/CSU, the senior partner in the Bonn coalition, is interesting too.

Christian Democrats find it extremely difficult to discuss with due calm questions arising from the existence of nuclear weapons. TV journalist Franz Alt is a case in point.

Professor Biedenkopf recently sought to underpin, in an essay in a book entitled *Die Atomschwelle heben* (Raise the Nuclear Threshold), his view that preserving the peace with arms depends on public approval.

Given this need for public approval and support, efforts must be undertaken to relegate to an increasingly minor role the part to be played by nuclear weapons.

This, he argues, is absolutely essential as people are steadily less ready to tolerate what he calls the "nuclear borderline situation."

Biedenkopf drew up this concept over two years ago to make his point that peace preservation today by Nato and the Warsaw Pact resembles the situation of mountaineers who have lost their way on a sheer rock face and can no longer go either up or down.

This is a striking piece of imagery but



Kurt Biedenkopf... seeking new strategy. (Photo: Poly-Press)

Biedenkopf's critics wonder whether it is an accurate comparison.

They are anxious to conduct their dispute with him to as little public attention as possible, probably at the next session of the appropriate CDU committee.

His long-term aim is to replace peace preservation that is unable to dispense with the nuclear deterrent by a new approach to keeping the peace in freedom that derives its strength from a political peace order in Europe.

That is CDU policy. The CDU's May 1982 Berlin Declaration states: "We will have to live with the nuclear borderline situation for the foreseeable future."

"It obliges us to seek wholeheartedly a feasible political peace order that might gradually take the place of the

prevention of war by means of military deterrence."

Even so, he can hardly feel too sure of himself if he refers to this statement in his defence. It was he who drew it up.

He coined the term "nuclear borderline situation" in an essay published in *Die Zeit* in 1981 and forced the Christian Democrats to discuss it.

In the course of a lengthy process of change the former CDU general secretary has emerged as a pundit who feels Nato strategy, based as it expressly is on the first use of nuclear weapons, is in need of replacement.

In his new book *Die Atomschwelle heben* he writes: "The nuclear deterrent is intended to safeguard peace in Europe temporarily until an alternative has been found that guarantees security mainly politically and not primarily by military means."

He bases his departure from Nato strategy on the obvious shortfall in public approval of Western security policy in connection with implementation of the dual-track decision.

He refers with regret to the "nuclear borderline situation" facing mankind and to what he sees as an intolerable lack of solutions that besets peace preservation today.

This being the case, he calls for something new. It never occurs to him to ask whether the valid strategy really leads to a state of affairs to which there is no solution.

Franz Böckle, the Catholic moral theologian, finds such behaviour extremely suspicious. In general terms he recently told the Bundeswehr staff college in Blumensee, Hamburg, that "our constant calling Nato strategy into question does a disservice to the cause of peace."

Professor Böckle said ethical responsibility for discussing security policy must be borne in mind. Does Kurt Biedenkopf do this responsibility justice?

He himself must subjectively be convinced he does. But even he will have to admit there is a great deal of utopian thinking involved inasmuch as the main feature of European politics remains the Soviet striving for supremacy.

Doubts must be voiced as to Biedenkopf's understanding of Nato strategy. You cannot very well complain of the general public not accepting what you yourself have misinterpreted.

Fellow-Christian Democrat Alois Mertes, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, has pointed out Biedenkopf's foremost misinterpretation of strategy:

"There is no such thing as the understanding Biedenkopf claims to exist that nuclear systems will never be used. It would pull the rug from under Western strategy."

"It would also make conventional war more likely and with it, in the final analysis, the nuclear borderline situation."

Bundeswehr inspector-general Wolfgang Altenburg, for instance, describes the Bonn government's efforts and those of the entire Western alliance:

"The aim is to create 'conventional strength'. A high degree of conventional capacity makes us independent of the nuclear theatre option and the inevitable consequences of nuclear escalation."

"I should like the first use of nuclear weapons to be a politically motivated use, with politicians making the decision to redress the balance of deterrence and end the fighting."

(Rüdiger Moniac, *Die Welt*, 4 February 1984)

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■ THE ECONOMY

Government expects increase in growth and investment

Bonn's annual economic report expects growth this year of 2.5 per cent compared with only 1.2 last year; unemployment to drop from 2.26 million to 2.2 million; investment to rise; retail prices to rise only 3 per cent; and demand, output and incomes to rise faster than last year. The report was compiled by Economic Affairs Minister Count Lambsdorff.

The recovery of the German economy has followed a pattern different from the course of past economic cycles.

This time the economy has regained momentum even though exports have failed to lead the way, tending indeed to put a damper on the upturn.

Export orders used invariably to be the driving force behind economic recovery. It now seems to have been re-kindled and could well put on speed.

Demand from abroad has definitely increased since late autumn, though not in equal measure in all industries, but it can already be said to be widespread.

Estimates for 1984 have recently been revised upwards. Exports may, it is now felt, increase by between five and six per cent in real terms.

The main reason is that the international economy is out of the doldrums, having been pulled out of the trough by the United States and Canada, where growth has been unexpectedly brisk.

Economic recovery has been almost as bolsterous in Japan, spreading to other industrialised countries, with the developing countries benefiting from buying by others who have made more headway.

As a result world trade, which last year increased by a little over one per cent, is likely to grow by five per cent in 1984, which is incidentally, far from unusual.

It is a growth rate that was common as recently as in the 1970s, although it was invariably followed by a decline. But this time the risk is less serious.

The groundwork has been laid more soundly: inflation has been curbed considerably, and not only in the Federal Republic, and governments have resisted the temptation to go in for pump-priming.

Attempts are being made to contain government debts in many countries, although not in the United States. And these are not the only differences.

In contrast with the 1970s economic trends are not keeping step. Some countries are in the lead, others are trailing, and Germany is at present in the midfield.

Even if economic recovery were to falter in countries that are front runners at present, the others have made so much headway by now that they can lend further impetus.

Growth rates will clearly be lower than if all countries were to forge ahead simultaneously, but there is a much better chance of the upturn lasting longer and inflation not getting out of hand.

That is definitely a very much more favourable configuration for the growth process in the Federal Republic, which is not to say that all the risks that beset the world economy have been dealt with.

Many Third World countries are still deeply in debt. But even they will find the situation easier to cope with if they are able to boost exports.

If they are to be able to do so the industrialised countries must keep their markets open and reverse the trend toward protectionism that has been set in of late.

It is wishful thinking to expect the many tariff and non-tariff barriers to be lifted once the upturn has definitely established itself.

The United States is by no means the only country to prove this is not the case. In Europe too the temptation to put foreign competitors at a disadvantage is substantial.

Both trade unions and employer are leaning heavily on governments to support home industry in view of high unemployment.

So politicians everywhere will need to go to great lengths to remedy the situation, and the fight against protectionism is a key issue at international conferences to be held this year.

But in view of the US Presidential election campaign prospects of steps in the direction of freer world trade being taken this year are slight.


Hopes are placed in the mid-1980s, and they are not unfounded. Free trade would certainly further improve the outlook for German exports, which in spite of cutbacks have held their own remarkably well against competition.

Exports are already a mainstay of the upswing, ranking alongside investment, and the more technological innovations are imported.

That is sure to shore up the ability of

German industry to stay competitive, a point that has been called into question to an unwarranted extent. Much would be easier if interest rates were to decline, but the outlook is still extremely bright, all told. Before long the old adage that when exports get going it can't be long before domestic business picks up should apply again.

Hans-Jürgen
Mahnke
(Die Welt,
6 February 1984)



Good reactions all-round to Lambsdorff's report

Economic Affairs Minister Count Lambsdorff's economic report for 1984 is a fine job of work, and its most striking feature is that it owes its success to neither the favourable economic data nor blinding announcements of specific tax, research, energy or welfare policy measures.

The report provides a cohesive outline of an economic policy aimed in many ways at reactivating market forces that have been blocked.

This explanation of the basic ideas behind a policy aimed first and foremost

at reducing unemployment is invaluable for purposes of public discussion.

This is true regardless whether you happen to feel the methods advocated are right or wrong.

The response from some quarters of the business community has been enthusiastic, which could be taken to mean that the report is sympathetic towards interests of capital or the entrepreneur.

But the trade union response proves that the Minister has succeeded in getting across his economic policy objectives in a way that eliminates suspicion on this score.

He can no longer be suspected of a difference to the unemployment figures or of making common cause with employers to redistribute power and earnings in their interest.

Economic policy spokesmen for the SPD Opposition will themselves have to hest at their verdict, which is that the government has no answer to the problem of unemployment, ignores the report. Views may differ on how to deal with the problem and how much needs doing, but no-one can deny that Count Lambsdorff has put together a convincing package consisting of seemingly disparate aspects of economic policy.

They include a reduction in public borrowing requirement, priority for reducing wage bills and partial deregulation of labour regulations.

They are plausibly arranged in a suggested solution to the problem aimed at reactivating economic dynamism and so creating new jobs.

With the publication of the economic report the Minister can no longer be accused of inability to do other than by catchphrases his economic policy working hypothesis that market forces are more effective than public spending to boost demand.

The report is also honest in explaining in the context of economic strategy that priority for investment and job creation after a lengthy period of slender profits will depend on a substantial redistribution to boost earnings on capital.

At the same time the report points out

Continued on page 7

■ BUSINESS

The resurgence of the suggestion box

Christ und Welt
Abendlicher Merkur

Thinking round in leisure time by telecommunications worker Kurt Hügge paid off for both him and his employer, the Bundespost, the Federal postal authority.

He developed a system of using a special team to trace faulty components in teleprinter circuits.

The Bundespost saves a million marks a year because of it and Hügge was rewarded with a payment of more than 50,000 marks.

This is an outstanding example. But it is not typical for the public service. Though there are about 305,000 employees in the Bundespost, in 1982 there were only 4,350 suggestions for improvements.

About 1,300 of them were rewarded with cash, certificates, stamp collections or the honour of a lunch with the Minister of Post and Telegraphs.

But now the Bundespost is to try and follow industry and give its suggestion box system a shake-up. The man in charge of the project is Werner Gleissner, who represents the minister in this area.

More than 600,000 copies of a brochure urging employee to think about their workplace occasionally during leisure hours have been produced.

Financial incentives have also been planned with a payment equivalent to 10 per cent of the annual saving of any

Continued from page 6

that this need not be the case for more than a limited period.

Against the background of an economic report that does not deny the risk of recovery taking a turn for the worse the government can fairly claim the right to appeal to the parties to collective bargaining not to block the road to growth by a fresh avalanche of costs.

In doing so it is merely complying with its constitutional duty to provide guidelines for all sectors of society.

Hans D. Barbier

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3 February 1984)

proposition that is acted upon. Maximum reward will be 100,000 marks.

The importance of ideas from employees was recognised as long ago as 1872 by industrialist Alfred Krupp. He issued instructions that suggestions be encouraged.

Since there has hardly another practice as firmly established in modern management as the suggestion box.

Despite this, the system has not been used to its full potential, says Norbert Thom, a member of the board of consultants Gesellschaft für Organisation, in Giessen.

However, there is no shortage of success stories from larger firms using the system. For example, IBM Deutschland has paid out bonuses of four million marks for schemes which have saved them 14 million marks.

Curt Freudenberg KG, in Weinheim, suppliers to the motor industry, say that the cost of setting up their system was clawed back within six months.

Fritz Ziegler, board member of Ruhrkohle AG, also believes in the suggestion box system because he believes that the success of a business depends on the willingness of its employees. It is an ideal way, he says, of learning cooperation.

The suggestion box system, he says, is a method through which management can motivate and inform employees about what is happening in the works, in a way of getting them involved and of convincing them that their opinions are both wanted and useful.

In most companies, an independent assessor plus a panel drawn from various groups in the business itself decide on the merit of suggestions and the size of the rewards. The terms by which these decisions are reached are often clearly defined in in-house agreements.

Propositions must be presented as precisely as possible to show how costs can be cut, jobs safeguarded, the firm's prestige increased or the environment protected.

Rewards are made normally when there are direct results at the workplace. Otherwise there must be some outstanding development over and above the requirements of the job.

Thom says the strategic long-term policies must be developed to avoid the suggestion-box system degenerating.

Ziegler says the aim with Ruhrkohle



Brochure display urging staff to submit ideas.

(Photo: Wolf-Dieter Köhler)

for a long time have not merely been increases in productivity and efficiency.

Suggestion boxes were a way of finding talent. Workers could be given more demanding tasks to suit their skills and they could win promotion and sent for further training.

Herbert Nowak, who is in charge of the suggestion box at Volkswagen AG in Wolfsburg, can hardly complain about lack of support from top management.

Chairman of the board Carl H. Hahn seldom misses the opportunity at staff meetings to push the suggestion-box system.

Between January and September last year, VW rewarded 7,281 suggestions with bonuses totalling almost nine million marks. This was nearly as much as in the whole of 1982.

Foremen at VW are obliged personally to make the fraternal request to workers to "think of something" as they hand out suggestion forms.

Beyond that, Nowak in general terms has a programme designed to develop ways of getting ideas from the workforce.

Every suggestion is given a tangible reward, regardless of whether it is likely to be put into action or not. As an example of the company's style, it gave out candlesticks last October to the 14,000 women on the staff as an advance for any ideas that might be thrown up.

Another promotional trick is regular lottery prizes: portable stereo sets, bicycles, kitchen appliances and even holidays are offered and won.

To keep the pot boiling, IBM management aims at the "sporting instincts" of the staff. Each month the number of suggestions are toted up and the de-

partment with the most gets the winner's cup.

Pens and pencils with the slogan "Don't get Angry, Suggest How Things Can Be Improved," are constant reminders of the programme.

That is one reason why computer manufacturers, with around 7,000 employees, get suggestions from about 28 per cent of their staff. By contrast, the electronic industry figure is nine per cent. The figure for industry as a whole is even lower, seven per cent.

The signs are good that these figures will get better. Janina von Glowacki, suggestion-box authority at the Deutschen Institut für Betriebswirtschaft, is convinced that the idea is gaining ground.

A hundred and seventy firms with a combined payroll of almost three million have made contact at the Institute to exchange ideas. Specialist magazines report on what the various firms are doing.

Already there are imitators who think that rather than paying employees for ideas, that new forms of group work are a better form of motivation.

The works newspaper EHD-Echo, of mechanical engineering group Klöckner-Humboldt-Deutz AG (KHD) in Cologne, asked workers for suggestions about bringing into gear their specialist knowledge. Group work, suggests the paper, would have a reciprocal effect on encouraging ideas.

Group thinking is certainly an essential part of Japanese strategy and is gaining more adherents in Germany.

August Rübinger

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 27 January 1984)

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■ RESOURCES

Bonn still holding fire on Law of the Sea convention

Frankfurter Allgemeine

The Law of the Sea Conference ended a year ago, but Bonn still hasn't made up its mind whether to sign the convention.

In legal terms, a convention does not become binding until it has been ratified.

But in the case of the Law of the Sea Convention legal and political circumstances could make it impossible to sustain the strict distinction between signing and ratifying.

As a result, even the decision on whether to sign or not calls for a provisional evaluation of whether the subsequent ratification should be recommended to the Bundestag.

Bonn has kept a close watch in the past few months on its foreign partners and their decisions.

These months have also given Bonn a chance to watch the work of the preparatory commission (precom), the body that is preparing the implementation of the Convention on behalf of all the signatories.

The major elements that will govern the ultimate decision are beginning to emerge.

Even now there is no legal pressure on Bonn because it has until December to sign and join the Convention.

But there are tactical reasons for taking a definite stand because Germany is seen as significant factor in determining the Convention's fate.

If Bonn wants to influence the further course of events it will soon have to make up its mind.

It is easier today than it was only two years ago to evaluate the Conference from Germany's point of view.

The question as to the propriety of the sweeping rights the Convention grants coastal nations has been defused.

Many countries have in the past few years done anyway what is provided for in the Convention. This means that the expansion of territorial and economic zones is already internationally accepted and has become part of customary law.

But important questions like the further development of this customary law remain open.

Still, none of these issues concern German interests to the point where they should have a major bearing on Bonn's decision.

This argument that the future development of the Law of the Sea can be orderly only if subject to a formal convention carries no great weight.

As in other areas of international law, here, too, the law of usage can become an effective instrument of international relations. This applies even — or indeed particularly — when the interests of the countries concerned are at variance.

All this points to the fact that the major aspect in assessing the Convention is not so much the rights of the coastal nations but the regulations governing deep-sea mining.

Here, the Convention has actually come up with new laws that are binding only for countries that have ratified it.

The developing nations claim that this is not so. But they are wrong.

The extremely high cost of deep-sea

mining as provided for by the Convention has made its adoption by the Western industrial countries important — for financial if for no other reasons.

From a German point of view, the Convention's deep-sea mining provisions are negative. They violate the free market principles to which Germany owes its post-war affluence and which have guided Bonn's foreign trade policy.

Deep-sea mining would of necessity be centrally planned, protectionist and bureaucratic.

The provisions on the transfer of technology to the international authority to be set up for this purpose and to interested developing countries are a novelty in terms of international laws on ownership.

The strict provisions on the limitation of mining quotas are based on the one-sided and short-term interests of a few countries.

The establishment and the functioning of the International Seabed Authority and Enterprise as part of it is based on a concept that would replace orderly competition by central planning.

Moreover, the Convention replaces legal security by the principle of majority decision without protection for minorities: a review conference will have the right to amend the Convention with a 75 per cent majority.

All these restrictions of freedoms are familiar. But the rekindled discussion of the Convention is reason enough to highlight them again.

The Third World regards the deep-sea mining provisions as a model for a new international economic order.

It would be short-sighted and unrealistic not to take this challenge to our free trade based economic order seriously.

The current efforts by the Third World to change the system of international economic relations make the decision on future deep-sea mining an acid test of economic steadfastness for the Western industrial nations.

So the negative assessment of the Convention has nothing to do with whether German industry wants to give deep-sea mining priority or not.


Bonn's decision on the Convention will have to take into account foreign policy as well as strictly economic considerations.

There is also a practical element that has nothing to do with economic or foreign policy.

One of the main arguments of those in favour of signing is that only thus could Bonn influence the Preparatory Commission's work on deep-sea mining. But this standpoint has so far had no concrete effect.

Bonn has observer status on the Pre-

What the Law of the Sea Conference decided



The positions of the various Western European countries differ. Half of the European Community members have decided to sign the Convention. This speaks neither for nor against Bonn signing it.

But the situation changes when the Third World is taken into account. As was to be expected, many African, Asian and Latin American countries signed the Convention last year. In their view, nations that oppose the Convention lack solidarity and are uncooperative.

The Soviet Union has already capitalised on this and now publicly promotes the Convention, presenting itself as a partner of the Third World.

This makes it obvious that Bonn's efforts to improve relations with the Third World would be set back if it rejected the Convention.

On the other hand, a decision in favour would put a considerable strain on Bonn's relations with Washington because the USA rejects it.

Even though Washington has repeatedly changed its view of the Convention and could do so again, Bonn's decision in favour of it would be full of problems. It has no choice but to take realities within the Alliance into account.

It is thus obvious that not all foreign policy considerations governing a pro or con decision point in the same direction. But right now Alliance considerations speak against signing.

There is also a practical element that has nothing to do with economic or foreign policy.

One of the main arguments of those in favour of signing is that only thus could Bonn influence the Preparatory Commission's work on deep-sea mining. But this standpoint has so far had no concrete effect.

Bonn has observer status on the Pre-

paratory Commission. Even though it has no vote, it can coordinate its interests with those of France or Japan, both of whom are voting members.

The way the voting functions, Bonn would in any event have no major influence. This was amply demonstrated during the Conference itself.

What matters is that the Preparatory Commission is free to make decisions on individual issues but must essentially stick to the framework of the Convention and the principles on which it is based.

It is unrealistic to assume that the basic provisions of the Convention can more easily be modified through cooperation in the Commission than through a concerted alliance initiative.

There is also the fact that legal experts differ on whether the mere signing of the Convention makes deep-sea mining subject to its provisions or whether a ratification that prevents the independent exploitation of the seabed.

Both sides have sound arguments. France, for instance, holds that deep-sea mining should be governed by both national law and the Convention.

But the opposite legal view to the effect that signing the Convention narrows the legal scope for future deep-sea mining is also sound.

What matters here is that the Western industrial countries, including Japan, are trying to reach an agreement that would serve as a basis for a future common law of the sea policy for themselves.

Under these circumstances, the argument that German interests are best protected by signing the Convention can longer play a decisive role. On the contrary.

One could nevertheless argue that signing would enable Germany to take a constructive part in the many efforts to promote an international order through negotiations and strengthening international organisations.

The Law of the Sea Conference was the most sweeping post-war attempt to restructure a particularly important aspect to international relations through orderly negotiation.

A failure of the Conference could weaken international efforts to solve conflicts.

This aspect will have to be weighed against those that speak against the Convention.

It should also be taken into account that the Conference began its work with such lofty ideals as the realisation of man's heritage and then deteriorated into a process aimed at preserving and distributing power.

Protection of minorities, universal conciliation of interests and just justice became secondary.

Rudolf Dolber
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 February 1984)

■ MOTORING

Tests reveal dangers of stress at the wheel

Stress is dangerous for drivers. It can lead to mistakes and crashes.

Even rally drivers suffer from stress in certain situations, as has been shown in trials at the Ford proving ground in Lommel, Belgium.

The tests were commissioned by a German road safety organisation.

Traffic psychologist Professor Gerald Stöcker of Würzburg University used 10 specially developed devices to measure the reactions, concentration, alertness and tension of both rally drivers and learners.

Measurements were taken before, during and after a difficult test run to check the physical and mental strain they underwent.

There were four test drivers and the run was over a distance of about 25km, at 15 miles. Before the run their readings were all normal.

Tests included tricky exercises in which they had to react with hands and feet to coloured lights and sounds. In these tests, carried out before the run, the performances of rally drivers and learners did not differ strikingly.

But during the test run and afterwards the figures differed considerably.

The pros were a 34-year-old rally driver and a 25-year-old woman who is a rally cup-holder.

The amateurs were an 18-year-old schoolgirl who had held a licence for six weeks and a 19-year-old student with three months' driving practice.

The test run was far from easy, with fast sections, dangerous bends and gradients of up to one in three. But there was no time limit set.

The pros took about 15 minutes to go round the course. The learners, driving the same cars, Ford Triums, took between 26 minutes and half an hour.

A skin resistance measuring device attached to two finger-ends registered tension throughout, and both groups showed clear signs of stress.

A further surprise was that manual gears, as used by the rally drivers, generated twice as much stress as cars with an automatic gearbox.

His advice to learners is to get all the

The adrenalin output that mobilises energy in tricky situations invariably triggers readiness to act. The pros showed immediate signs of action aimed at concentrating on their driving.

The middle brain had activated hormones that prompted them to drive to the utmost of their ability.

This heightened readiness to act led the inexperienced learner drivers to feel extra scared and ready to make a getaway.

The 18-year-old girl in particular at times seriously misjudged her handling of the wheel, failed to spot trouble on bends in time and crashed her gears in a way that made her co-driver break out in cold sweat.

She frankly admitted after the test run that she had grossly overestimated her own ability, whereas the 19-year-old boy was clearly more experienced and showed greater self-possession and presence of mind.

His post-run ratings were much better than hers. He drove a family saloon regularly in town and on the autobahn. Both had driven the test run once before. Both said they were a little excited and tense, but not afraid.

In tests after the run Professor Stöcker was surprised to find that all four were much slower to react to optical and acoustic stimuli, a sign of tiredness.

Since this response was registered after driving for only about 20 minutes it was not difficult to imagine what it might be after driving much further.

Finger-end tension was found to vanish almost immediately after the run with the rally drivers, whereas it continued for up to 20 minutes with the learners.

Professor Stöcker's tests have now shown for the first time how serious the effect of stress on road-users really is.

Joachim M. Stramp
(Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 February 1984)

Drunken driving continues to kill

STUTTGARTER NACHRICHTEN

The time it takes for alcohol to enter the bloodstream, and the amount that finds its way there, don't just depend on the quantity of alcohol consumed.

Mental and physical factors are at least as important. Healthy, well-fed drinkers who take their time will take longer to get drunk than sick, tired people who drink fast or on an empty stomach.

Frame of mind can affect the effect of alcohol for better or for worse. So in different ways, and unnoticed, people reach the stage at which they are no longer fit to drive.

A Waiblingen judge, Herr Hünecke, has said it would be wrong to equate fitness to drive with being drunk. He is



Road-side matinee

First the drive, then the film. A driving school in Düsseldorf has introduced the video system so the pupil can go through the lesson again with the help of a film from a video camera mounted on the back seat.

Practice alone will reduce stress that is converted into fear.

Practice on busy roads seems to make them feel even more worried, so training on proving grounds might be a suitable alternative.

Autogenic training is another way of fighting stress. The road safety organisation has made up a relaxation cassette designed by Professor Stöcker to help ease tension at the wheel.

Results in relief of muscle tension, more even breathing, lower blood pressure. All the exercises can be carried out only at home or in the parking lot, of course, and not at the wheel.

Heidelberg social medic Hans Schäfer lists heart attacks as typical stress complaints, but he also mentions crashes by learner drivers with fatal consequences.

They are overburdened by the stress of driving, make mistakes, crash and die. The result is a drastic decline in life expectancy.

Professor Stöcker's tests have now shown for the first time how serious the effect of stress on road-users really is.

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(Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 February 1984)

His advice to learners is to get all the

associated with a campaign against drinking and driving.

The law on drunken driving that has been in force for the past 10 years, he says, does not specify blood alcohol counts at which motorists are unfit to drive.

It merely says that a level of 80 milligrams of alcohol per decilitre of blood is an offence for which a fine must be imposed.

Supreme Court rulings indicate that unfitness to drive may occur at a level of 30 milligrams.

The present arrangement may be criticised for being obscure, yet all drivers know that offenders with between 80 and 129 milligrams are liable to a fine and maybe a driving ban.

Drunken drivers with a higher alcohol count are guilty of a criminal offence and invariably face a driving ban.

Schnapps, beer or wine are a matter of personal taste, but whatever the reason for drinking them, for your own interest and that of everyone else you would be well advised not to drive after drinking any alcohol at all.

Michael N. Lezsak
(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 28 January 1984)

The court agreed, ruling that the local authority was partly to blame for the

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■ EDUCATION

Catching up with US, Japan: dispute over plan for private high-tech universities

The idea of setting up private universities in the Federal Republic of Germany was not, by any stretch of the imagination, first mooted by Foreign Minister Genscher.

Herdecke in the Ruhr already has a private university with its first intake of medical students and has gone in for new ideas in student selection and teaching methods.

Herdecke is an experiment that has been widely acclaimed. In Koblenz, on the Rhine, the chamber of commerce and industry is setting up a three-language school of business studies.

It is to be financed by donations from industry and by charging students a fee of DM4,000 per semester.

Herr Genscher has now suggested setting up foundations to endow private university colleges specialising in high tech.

His idea is to help German industry bridge the gap between it and firms in the United States and Japan in, say, microelectronics and bioengineering.

At an international Aspen conference on American and European universities held in West Berlin it now transpires that Herr Genscher's high-tech private universities are not to be financed exclusively by private means.

A medium-sized university, as Dr Konrad Seitz, head of planning at the Foreign Office, admitted, costs between DM250m and DM300m a year to run.

DER TAGESSPIEGEL

Herr Genscher, he said, envisages industry and scientific foundations endowing the new universities with funds. Students' parents would pay the fees if they could afford them. The state would pay what was left.

It remained to be seen, the Aspen conference having failed to clarify the matter, whether what was left would in fact be the bulk of expenditure.

This was the point at which university experts began to express misgivings. German experts first referred to a resolution by the Prime Ministers of the Länder in 1977.

The Land Premiers had agreed to throw universities open to the influx of high birth-rate years as young people in this age group would otherwise never stand a chance of learning a trade.

The universities, which had long been suffering from overcrowding, were reluctant but tempted by an undertaking to hire extra teaching staff to cater for the extra intake.

This extra was put at well over 200,000 new students per semester, as against a more normal figure of 155,000.

But then came a slump and cuts in university spending. Little or no extra

cash was forthcoming, certainly not in amounts that made planning possible.

Grants for extra teaching staff were made by the semester, whereas the problem of high student intake at university is one that will last well into the 1990s.

Vice-chancellors of conventional universities are unlikely to welcome any suggestion of government funds being made available to private universities when existing universities are starved of cash.

Besides, German universities cannot agree that their standards are so poor they cannot be entrusted with top-flight research.

This point was strongly made by the representatives of the Standing Conference of West German University Vice-Chancellors, Professors Berchem and Seidel.

German universities, they said, were generally good, although not necessarily in all departments.

Private universities such as so far existed, the medical school in Herdecke and the school of business studies in Koblenz, could only be described as university departments, not as full universities.

Hopes placed in privately endowed colleges as elite training facilities were too high. They couldn't possibly live up to some politicians' expectations.

Professor Seidel, a chemist, said it was wildly romantic to hope to set up private elite universities in the space of five or six years.

Teams of scientists in the natural sciences in whom such expectations were placed needed time to develop organically, at least 15 years, he felt.

The representative of a leading scientific foundation agreed that it took decades to build up a good university. This could be seen from the fact that only two of the rash of new universities set up in the 1960s and 1970 had so far really soundly established themselves.

Widespread surprise

So stimuli for top-flight research and teaching should be sought within the state university system.

There was widespread surprise when the representatives of private universities in the United States that are constantly referred to as exemplary in Germany criticised Herr Genscher's proposals.

The president of Harvard, Derek Bok, said he was doubtful whether enough cash could be raised in donations in Germany to endow a private university.

He was equally sceptical about the possibility of launching any such university at speed. It would be more realistic to experiment more and ensure greater flexibility within the existing state framework.

This presupposed for one that university vice-chancellors and deans were given wider powers to engage in fresh research and experiments and to raise funds to finance them.

These experimental departments ought also to be entitled to select their own students and not be required to take what the university admissions bureau in Dortmund allocated them.

Professor Walter Rosenblith of MIT suggested a five- or 10-year research programme in bioengineering at the Federal Republic, a sector in which the Germans had fallen behind Japan and the United States.

Bioengineering ought to be declared a special research sector at several universities collaborating in biology, agricultural science and chemistry.

Promotion of bioengineering ought not to be carried out on the dubious basis of new and private establishments. Germany had a fine tradition of technical universities. All that was needed was to get them to collaborate.

It was agreed at the conference that knowledge of new technologies had to extend in sufficient measure to pupils, teachers and adults to meet future requirements.

Education and Arts Senator Kewenig of West Berlin agreed with Eberhard Böning of the Bonn Education Ministry that the universities had a major role to play in adult education in the new technologies.

Courses must be offered at various levels and for varying periods, preferably modelled on the wide range of further education courses provided by leading American universities.

At Harvard, for instance, the 15,000 full-time students are joined by 45,000 adults who return to university for fresher courses.

Courses can be for 10 days, ten months or up to a year. They can be extremely expensive for individual groups depending on length of course and interests.

Some are adults who want to improve their general education in the arts, philosophy, diplomats or would-be politicians train with particular interest for their future activities.

Executives who have so far specialised and now want to generalise go to Harvard Business School. Others who have found out from experience how to change jobs will also attend university courses.

There are no exams. Student motivation is felt to be enough — both at Harvard and at the MIT. Would-be executives come from all over the world to train in the United States rather than in Germany.

German universities, Professor Kewenig said, were lagging 20 years behind Harvard and the MIT because there is still a widespread belief in Germany that a trade was learnt for life.

In future people would change two or three times in their working lives and universities would need to cater for refresher courses and fresh courses.

Professor Kewenig took the opportunity of airing a favourite idea of his of sending students out to work for three or four years at university (then, of course, then recalling them for further courses years later).

He felt universities could still enhance mass training and training for elite by making only second degree comply with Humboldt's university requirement of old: the combination of teaching and research.

This brought the discussion back to circle. Senator Kewenig would provide elite facilities at the many universities and not leave this field to private universities.

(Der Tagesspiegel, 3 February)

NUMISMATICS

Island beach yields batch of mediaeval coins

The beach of the North Sea island of Föhr has yielded the largest find of early mediaeval coins ever found outside their areas of origin, Southern England and Frisia.

They are sceattas, 82 of them, tiny silver discs with a hallmark that have surfaced at a particular point on the beach.

The last of them seem to have surfaced last summer. They are now being checked by an expert from the Museum of Hamburg History for the Schleswig-Holstein department of prehistory in Schleswig.

Wolf Gremm

Continued from page 10

He is doing that right now. It lends a Berlin construction scandal involving losses totalling DM40m. There are intentional parallels with an affair that actually happened a few years ago.


Shooting is to begin in May, with Harald Juhnke starring as a roadworker.

He is the male lead in what Gremm says will be a comedy.

Rainer Nolden

(Die Welt, 21 January 1984)

Meteorological stations all over the world



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
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Some of the Föhr coins.

(Photos: Landesamt für Vor- und Frühgeschichte, Schleswig)

Hamburg magistrate's court. An official of the archaeology department tried his luck with a metal detector, but all he found was old beer cans and the like.

Finds did not continue in earnest until the seekers took to sieving the sand. But the 82 now found look likely to have been the lot.

They will have been washed out to sea when a Viking settlement was destroyed by the waves at this spot. They probably date to about 750 AD and were buried in a container.

We are unlikely ever to find out what value they had for their owner: whether they were for use in trading, a nest egg or the result of an early Viking foray.

Sceattas are both primitive and mysterious coins. They were minted at a time when government and order had reached a nadir in the aftermath of the great migrations.

When Rome fell, the system of mints and coins and weights and measures collapsed. The currency had already long been debased.

So old coins were used, or silver rings chopped up into pieces that were weighed on a balance.

Balances dating to this period have been widely found. They still work on the same principle and are accurate to within a hundredth of a gram.

Given this unsatisfactory state of affairs coins began to be minted irregularly, with no government guarantee or standard weight, for trading purposes.

They were struck where trade and the economy flourished and merchants were sick and tired of hawking and chopping up pieces of silver: along the southern reaches of the North Sea.

A kind of world trade went on there, with wool being imported from England and spun and woven into internationally acknowledged cloth qualities.

High-grade clay pots were made and sold, as were millstones made of Rhineish lava. All these goods were exported

across the North Sea and far into the Baltic.

In return furs, slaves and other products not always readily available were imported from the underdeveloped countries to the north and east.

So in Frisia, where all this trading went on, there was a need for rationalisation of business by means of striking coins in the early mediaeval period.

Sceattas were the coins. No-one knows who minted them. As likely as not, merchants and guilds ordered mint silver from a private mint.

At all events, coins were struck that didn't have standard weights, so they had to be weighed like bit silver, but they bore a hallmark as a guarantee of silver content.

All sceattas so far found are between 70 and 80 per cent silver. They weigh about one gram and were thus easier to carry around and weigh than bit silver.

The hallmark was taken with a pinch of salt. Most of the Föhr sceattas have been scratched to see whether they are all silver or just lead or copper plated in silver.

Counterfeiting and debasing of the currency have a tradition dating back to the Ancient World.

Sceattas were anything but works of art, unlike Roman coins. They usually have stick figures that are virtually impossible to identify.

The porcupine type could be a portrait with spiky hair. It has also been interpreted as a depiction of Romulus and Remus with the she-wolf.

The standard type looks as though it might feature a king. But it could be something else. Another type clearly shows a head and letters modelled on the appearance of Roman coins.

Others seem to depict a bird on a cross or a star of David. Another type, the Wotan and monster type, is missing entirely from the Föhr collection.

It could depict Wotan and Fenris the wolf, the hell's monster of the Icelandic sagas. Oddly enough, the finds further north, in Ribe, Denmark, consist entirely of Wotan sceattas.

This may mean the two troves are from different mints or, indeed, from different periods.

Large numbers of sceattas seem to have been struck. No two coins found in Föhr bear the same hallmark. There are plenty of porcupines, all similar but none identical.

Even if we assume that the unknown mints used hallmarks that soon wore out and had to be replaced, one run after another of these Anglo-Frisian coins seems to have been struck.

Struck to meet a need for trading in central and northern Europe, they were not replaced by proper coins until the Carolingian period.

It was then not long before Hattabu, a Viking settlement near Schleswig, began to mint its own coins.

But the sceattas, with their emblems that are a mixture of misunderstood Roman coins and Germanic ideas, still retain a charm of their own and are keenly collected.

Harald Steinert

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 3 February 1984)

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